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GEORGE H. DESSIONt
COMPLEX economic and technological issues have come before the
courts with increasing frequency in recent years, reflecting the growth
of regulatory legislation and the conflicts which account therefor.
Many of these issues originated before administrative agencies. Others
have originated as criminal or civil proceedings in the courts. Their
number is considerable. But there has been little comment on the
evidential-as distinguished from the substantive-problems involved.
This discussion will focus on the recurring types of economic and tech-
nological issues of fact presented in antitrust proceedings, particularly
those of the industry-wide type. Many of these proof problems are of
course similar to those which arise in other types of regulatory pro-
ceedings, so that conclusions here developed are not confined in ap-
plication to cases under the Sherman Act.
One unique aspect of these issues is their typical vastness of scope,
whether the issue be one of industry history, the purpose and effect of
some continuing "distributive practice, or the scale of operation nec-
essary to draw the maximum benefit from modem technology and to
contribute to the future development of that technology. The sheer
volume of factual material which must usually be assembled, evaluated,
and organized for presentation in court typically presents a task of
staggering proportions. Considerable adaptability and inventiveness
on the part of all involved in the processes of adjudication are necessary
if these issues are to be explored with the informed subtlety which they
deserve, rather than dealt with in broad-axe fashion.
Visual presentation devices for summarizing masses of data and ren-
dering them intelligible are of course at a premium, and no doubt will
be increasingly utilized as techniques progress. The history of a tech-
nology, for example, could probably most effectively be presented in the
form of a documentary film. Specially prepared studies, statistical and
otherwise, also bulk large in proof. Testimony by a variety of economic,
trade and marketing experts is another common feature. Novel ques-
* The concluding portion of Professor Dession's article will appear in the next issue
of the JouvAL.
-L Lines Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
HeinOnline  -- 58 Yale L. J. 1019 1948-1949
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
tions inevitably arise with respect to the admissibility of such evidence
and the possibility of relaxing certain foundation requirements nor-
mally adhered to in proceedings where proof is simpler and more man-
ageable. Court and counsel, indeed, not infrequently find that they
must proceed on relatively uncharted ground. Most of the more spe-
cific rules of evidence and procedure were, after all, developed in the
context of shorter and simpler trials. For evolving practice with re-
spect to economic proof one must therefore look to the trial courts.
Discussion of these evidential issues on the appellate level is relatively
meager. In lieu of operational formulations of standards of proof, the
opinions usually state merely that this or that proposition was "ade-
quately established by the evidence," or "clearly shown."
But what, for example, are the criteria for evaluating a circumstan-
tial case of conspiracy? How far may a given type of economic expert
witness go in drawing inferences with respect to the effects of various
industry practices and their impact on the possibilities of competition
in the industry, increased production, wider distribution, full employ-
ment, successful competition from abroad, and th6 American industrial
potential for national defense? What sorts of information may such
an expert take into account without necessity for its introduction into
evidence or availability to opposing counsel for purposes of cross-
examination? These are a few samples of the types of evidential issues
which recurrently arise and as to which counsel must make critical pre-
trial judgments-matters of no little concern considering the substan-
tial financial investment normally required to assemble any chosen
type of industry proof on issues of this nature. Beyond questions of
admissibility there are some important questions as to burden of proof.
Antitrust proceedings may, at the option of the government, be either
criminal or civil. Should a lighter burden of proof be required where the
proceeding is civil, or should this depend on the severity of the legal
sanctions actually to be imposed? I
CONSPIRACY TO RESTRAIN TRADE AND TO MONOPOLIZE-
THE NATURE OF THE ISSUES
A concentration of more than 50% of the production and sale of a
manufactured commodity or technologically related group of commodi-
1. Suppose, for example, that the government seeks dissolution, divorcement or di-
vestiture in an equitable proceeding under the Sherman Act. And cf. M. R. Cohen,
On Absolutisns in Legal Thought, 84 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 681, 686 (1936) : "As regards
substance and as regards procedure the civil and the criminal lawv overlap so that it is
impossible to say with absolute precision where one begins and the other ends, . . . As
to the difference of procedure, it is easy enough to call certain procedures criminal and
others civil, but not easy to define the difference .... Despite all sorts of theoretical
differences, such as the different degrees of evidence required, such civil actions do not
in effect differ very much from prosecutions to enforce penalties for certain misdemean-
[Vol. 58: 10191020
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ties in the hands of a relatively small number of otherwise distinct
business organizations seems increasingly typical of American in-
dustry ;2 and the pre-war case of Alcoa is an instance of even greater
concentration in one organization. The nature of the issues to be liti-
gated when such situations are challenged is our present concern. This
portion of the discussion will be based primarily on three recent anti-
trust proceedings-those against (1) the Tobacco Companies, 3 (2)
Alcoa,4 and (3) the Flat Glass group of manufacturers.5 The first and
last groups were alleged by the government to be oligopolies. Icoa
was alleged to be a monopoly. The first was a criminal proceeding
under the Sherman Act and the last two were equity proceedings. The
first two were litigated through to final judgment in favor of the govern-
ment. The last was partially litigated but terminated with a consent
decree. The focus of this portion of the discussion on these three cases
is based on the belief that the problems of trial preparation which they
presented are reasonably typical of the great majority of important
trade regulation cases.
Special interest attaches to the Supreme Court's opinion in the
Tobacco case. Together with the opinion of the court of appeals in the
Alcoa case, 6 it sheds considerable light on the difficult problem of what
constitutes monopoly under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Read
against the voluminous record, the Tobacco opinion is also suggestive
with respect to the central problem of proof in major oligopoly cases-
the criteria which will determine whether the transactions, practices,
and conditions relied upon by the government suffice as circumstan-
tial proof of conspiracy.
The sweeping repercussions of the Tobacco decision in this respect
become apparent when one compares the government's theory of ac-
tion therein with its allegations in other recent proceedings such as
that against the Flat Glass companies. In both of these cases the
government sought to portray as a unit separate and distinct companies
alleged to have conspired together in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act, to have committed restraints, and monopolized an
industry. In both, the "industry" or "trade and commerce" was so
ors .... Nor are the fines of the criminal law necessarily more severe than the civil
damages that are frankly recognized as punitive. Consider, for instance, the triple dam-
ages paid by the Danbury union hatters under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law.....
2. See Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. or CHL L. RLv. 153, 164
(1947).
3. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 32S U.S. 781 (1946).
4. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 14S F2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
5. See amended complaint filed March 19, 1946, in United States v. Libb2y-Owens-
Ford Glass Co., Civil No. 5239 (N.D. Ohio 1946), and consent decree dated October 30,
1948, CCH TRADa RxG. REP. (9th ed.) 1 62,323 (1948).
6. See especially that portion of Alcoa expressly adopted by the Supreme Court in
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 813 (1946).
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defined by the government as to include otherwise distinct lines of
trade and commerce, joining defendants engaged in only one of the
several lines and defendants who admittedly were not in existence or
operating in the conspiracy throughout the period of its alleged dura-
tion. And, while the Tobacco case was a criminal proceeding and Flat
Glass was civil, the government pleadings in both were drawn on the
same basic pattern. Inevitably, it is from this pattern that the issues
to be litigated arise.
The pattern consists in alleging an overall conspiracy to dominate,
under which practically everything done by the defendants in the con-
duct of their business over a long period of time, broken down into
classes of "practices", is subsumed.7 These classes became the "meth-
ods and means" whereby the alleged conspiracy was furthered. In
both cases factors such as price leadership, selective selling, cooperative
activities and the established position of the defendants figure prom-
inently in the allegations.
The government naturally relies on acts and transactions which
actually happened. The real issue is as to their ultimate characteriza-
tion and effect-not as isolated acts or transactions, but in the aggre-
gate and, of course, viewed long after the fact. The government found
this pattern effective in the Tobacco case. The convictions were
unanimously affirmed both in the court of appeals 8 and in the Supreme
Court of the United States. The Supreme Court's opinion, as we shall
see, went all out in endorsing the government's theory, and in addition
took occasion to endorse portions of Judge L. Hand's opinion in the
Alcoa case which are of significance here.
This is the pattern of attack in industries comprised of a few large
7. See United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F.Supp. 753, 902-3 (D,N,J. 1949),
per Forman, J.:
"There was little oral testimony offered on the part of the Government to de-
velop its case, reliance being placed upon documentary evidence or cross-examination
of defense witnesses. The major portion of the documents is from the files of the
defendants supplied on request of the Government and by stipulation their genuine-
ness and authenticity were admitted. Preliminary objections were offered to their
admissibility at pre-trial hearings. Certain documents were admitted into evidence
subject to objections of General Electric and International General Electric as con-
tained in their motion to strike for reasons therein specified on which decision was
reserved.
"The documents herein presented a panorama of corporate practices in a spe-
cialized field covering a period of fifty years. A major industry has been exposed
to a searching inquiry to determine whether in the light of the facts developed,
practices detrimental to trade and commerce of the United States are in existence.
Exaggerated and over refined niceties in the rules of evidence must give way to the
broad terms of Rule 43(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, if full effect to the
anti-trust laws is to be given."
8. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1944).
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units. The extent to which the government may be expected to con-
tinue to rely on it was indicated by the government brief filed in the
General Electric case 9 in which the Tobacco decision was cited through-
out.
In cases where it is the government's theory that an aggregate of
defendants have monopolized the trade and commerce in their field, a
conspiracy so to monopolize must of course be established, and the case
will stand or fall on that issue. Thus one searching question for evaluation
of a trial brief and general plan of offense or defense is: What factors
will determine whether an inference of conspiracy may be drawn from
any given transaction, agreement or cooperative arrangement between
two or more of the defendants, or from a common practice (pursued by
each with awareness that the others would probably do likewise)?
Proof of any conspiracy requires a showing of "intent". Under
Section 2, however, intent need not be "specific". It is enough if de-
fendants entertained a common purpose embracing the doing of acts
which, in the view of the court, tend to create a monopoly. This
"monopoly" which transactions and practices otherwise innocent may
not lawfully tend to foster is defined by the Court only as a power to
exclude existing or potential competitors from any part of interstate
trade and commerce, coupled with an intent to exercise the power. But
power is relative. To measure by the Court's formula an industry sit-
uation attributed to exclusionary practices, one must ask: What sorts
of competitors should be able to compete and under what conditions?
In the Tobacco case the court was not obliged to, and did not, answer
these questions. The Alcoa case is of course distinguishable, since it was
not one of "oligopoly". The latter opinion, however, clarifies the de-
sired "organization of industry" against which agreements and common
purposes may not work without giving rise to the inference of a con-
spiracy in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The organization
to be fostered and protected, according to Judge L. Hand, is one of
"small units which can effectively compete with each other," and this
state of things is desired "for its own sake," and "in spite of possible
cost." 10
In view of this underlying philosophy any oligopoly case presents two
broad issues: (1) Is the industry as presently constituted monopolistic
within the meaning of the Sherman Act? This is the "effects" part of
the case, on which the defense must take the initiative and develop its
own picture of the industry, or more often than not fail. An adequate
showing on this issue depends on the economic proof-the industry
history, technological factors, distribution problems, and problems of
foreign competition. The government may not develop this phase of
the case, since public policy as well as legal norms in these areas are
9. Filed Aug. 30, 1946.
10. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
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unintegrated and unclear." The defense should therefore primarily
be organized around an affirmative exposition of this issue. And (2),
were particular acts or transactions in which defendants participated
done with an actual purpose (or specific intent) to restrain or exclude
competitors, or otherwise "dominate" the industry? From a defense
point of view this is the negative phase of the case. The Answer will
presumably deny such purpose or intent. Throughout the trial the
effort will be to place every questioned act or transaction in its total
context of motivation, effect, and government-approved policy as of
the time; in short, to localize it.
By these standards, typical highlights of an antitrust defense include
propositions such as the following: The product contributes to the
economy; the history of its technology, together with the requirements
of the technology, show that it cannot feasibly be manufactured and
distributed by small or single-plant units; selective selling is necessary
and has nothing to do with any monopolistic purpose; price leadership,
generally speaking, is unavoidable as a competitive matter; the real
difficulties which would confront a new competitor in the field are in-
herent in the advanced state of the technology, in the conditions of
conducting business on a nation-wide scale, and in the nature, hand-
ling and use of the product; operation on a nation-wide basis is justified,
since competition would otherwise be reduced; the size and scale of
operation of actual and potential foreign competitors have a bearing on
the problems of the American-owned and/or managed companies.
A. Factual Background of Conspiracy: The Tobacco Case
The legal standards thus far suggested are, for the government, the
most favorable for which support can be found in the opinions in
American Tobacco Co. v. United States or any of the related decisions,.
Actually, given the facts summarized and commented upon in the
opinion of the Supreme Court as well as in the opinion below, there
was no necessity for the Court to go so far. (The certiorari was limited
to the substantive question of interpretation of Section 2 of the Act,
but "All the grounds urged for review of those judgments were con-
sidered here on petitions for certiorari.") 12
Salient differences between the Tobacco case and some other oli-
gopoly cases including the Flat Glass case should be noted at the out-
11. Cf. Levi, supra note 2, at 183: "The Sherman Antitrust law embodies a tradition
against monopolies. That tradition is confused. It is not clear whether we are against
monopolies or only against their abuses. For almost all of the history of the act, it has
been applied as a practical matter only against the abuses.... Today, however, as a
result of an increased awareness of the monopoly problem, and as a result of the Alcoa
and American Tobacco decisions we appear to have a new interpretation of the act,
closer probably to its original intention. ...
12. 328 U.S. 781, 784 (1946).
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set, especially since many of them lie in facts on which the Supreme
Court placed considerable emphasis.
The Tobacco case centered around a single product-cigarettes-of
relatively simple manufacture. They can, after all, be rolled by hand.
The machines employed are small and relatively inexpensive units.
No complex technology confronts the newcomer (many club brands,
for example, are manufactured by small independents operating in
lofts). No special problems are involved in handling and shipment.
Demand is constant. Distributive overhead costs are at a minimum.
In the hands of the retailer- of whom no special skill, service or equip-
ment is required-the product sells itself. Consumer preference in the
field-according to evidence which the court of appeals found sub-
stantial-depends largely on national advertising.
In contrast to the position of Flat Glass manufacturers in relation to
their major customers in the automobile industry, each of the "Big
Three" manufacturers of cigarettes is bigger than any of its customers
or, for that matter, its suppliers of raw materials.
Another distinguishing feature of the Tobacco case consists in the
nature of the conspiracy proof. While the mass of the government's
evidence was circumstantial, there was clear and direct evidence of
collusion between the Big Three on a variety of occasions, Withi the
express nwtive and purpose to exclude com peting ten-cent brands. There
was, for example, the so-called "Denver Incident," when representa-
tives of each of the Big Three met together to devise means of ma-
nipulating the retail differential between the standard and "ten-cent"
brands to the disadvantage of the latter. Its existence was proved by a
series of written reports extending over a considerable period of time
made by a Reynolds field superintendent to his home office. The same
express motive and purpose in connection with other practices pursued
by the defendants individually was similarly proved by direct written
admissions. On several occasions the defendants cut their prices and
sold at a loss in order to reverse an upward trend in the sales of the
ten-cent brands.' 3 Other evidence of efforts on the part of the defend-
ants to control the resale price of the ten-cent brands, as well as their
own, through a system of rewards and penalties for dealers, imple-
mented by an efficient check-up system, was found by the court of
appeals to warrant the jury in finding from the conduct of each of the
defendants an intent to monopolize, and the practices in question were
viewed as illegal in themselves quite apart from the element of combi-
nation, within the rule of FTC v.. Beech-Nut Packing Co.'4
13. Id. at 806.
14. 257 U.S. 441 (1921). See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F2d
93, 113 (6th Cir. 1944).
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B. Theory of an Overall Conspiracy
While centering as a matter of trial emphasis in the Tobacco case on
cigarettes, the government's theory of action embraced restrictive and
monopolistic practices in the purchase of leaf in the auction and hogs-
head markets as well as in the manufacture and distribution of cig-
arettes. Major leaf dealers and buyers of leaf for export were named
defendants along with the cigarette manufacturers." Shortly before
trial the defendants other than the Big Three were severed on
stipulation to abide by the outcome as against the Big Three, but
evidence of the leaf purchasing practices of all defendants was used at
the trial. The government was therefore obliged-to meet objections
of duplicity and variance--to show that the purposes and practices of
defendants on the leaf markets, in manufacture and in distribution,
were interdependent. That this was done in a factual way will be ap-
parent from the evidence hereinafter discussed. In any alleged oli-
gopoly case some comparable interdependence of purpose of the de-
fendants' dealings in producing and distributing their own products
must be shown. The government's position may be assumed to be that
the several products are so interchangeable in use as to be competitive
with one another, that a monopoly of the trade in any one of them
would be ineffective without a monopoly of all, or that some other
comparable functional relationship exists.
C. Circumstantial Proof of Conspiracy in the Tobacco Case
In the Tobacco case the allegations of conspiracy were predicated in
part on circumstances and practices falling into the following general
categories: established position of defendants in the industry; price
leadership; selective selling; and cooperative activities through trade
associations and otherwise in the past. A review of the Tobacco evi-
dence under each of these heads, and of the judicial comment thereon,
may be of assistance in evaluating the findings in that case in relation
to the evidence in other cases.
Established position in the industry: As of 1939 the Big Three cig-
arette manufacturers in the aggregate were producing about 68% of
all American-made small cigarettes, and about 80% of the fifteen-cent
or standard brands. Their shares in this business were roughly equal,
and the three had enjoyed their predominant position in the industry
for over a generation.
The district court charged that jury that:
"It is in no respect a violation of the law that a number of indi-
viduals or corporations, each acting for himself or itself, may own
15. Criminal No. 6670 (F.D.Ky.), filed July 24, 1940 and conformed to Court's order
of Oct. 30, 1940.
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or control a large part, or even all of a particular commodity, or all
the business of a particular commodity." 1G
On the underlying assumption that a conspiracy in violation of Section
2 had been proved, however, the Supreme Court commented that:
"Without adverse criticism of it, comparative size of this great
scale inevitably increased the power of these three to dominate all
phases of their industry. 'Size carries with it an opportunity for
abuse that is not to be ignored when the opportuniky is proved to have
been utilized in the past.' United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106,
116. An intent to use this power to maintain a monopoly was found
by the jury in these cases." (Emphasis supplied) 17
"The fact . . . that the purchases of leaf tobacco and the sales of
so many products of the tobacco industry have remained largely
within the same general group of business organizations for over a
generation, inevitably has contributed to the ease with which con-
trol over competition within the industry and the mobilization of
power to resist new competition can be exercised." 18
As of 1939, their combined assets exceeded $551,000,000, and their
combined net income exceeded $75,000,000. It was also shown that
in each of the years 1937, 1938 and 1939, the Big Three expended a
total of over $40,000,000 a year for advertising. The Supreme Court
commented on this advertising as follows:
"Such advertising is not here criticized as a business expense.
Such advertising may benefit indirectly the entire industry, includ-
ing the competitors of the advertisers. Such tremendous advertis-
ing, however, is also a widely published warning that these com-
panies possess and know how to use a powerful offensive and de-
fensive weapon against new competition. New competition dare
not enter such a field, unless it be well supported by comparable
national advertising." 19
As presented to the jury, however, this advertising had a significance
beyond the size or power of the defendants. It appeared as an integral
part of the mechanism whereby jobbers and retailers were compelled
by the defendants to carry cigarettes at small profit or even a loss,
given the consumer demand and defendants' manipulation of jobbers'
and retailers' resale prices.
With regard to defendants' industry position generally, the Court
stated:
"Large inventories of leaf tobacco, and large sums required for pay-
16. 328 U.S. 781, 785 (1946).
17. Id. at 796.
18. Id. at 793.
19. Id. at 797.
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ment of federal taxes in advance of actual sales, further emphasize
the effectiveness of a well financed monopoly in this field against
potential competitors if there merely exists an intent to exclude such
competitors. Prevention of all potential competition is the natural
program for maintaining a monopoly here, rather than any program
of actual exclusion. 'Prevention' is cheaper and more effective than
any amount of 'cure.' " (Emphasis supplied) 20
The large stocks of leaf tobacco kept on hand at all times by the
defendants figured prominently in the case. These normally exceed
$100,000,000 in value for each company, and were said by the defend-
ants to be necessary to insure proper aging of the tobacco, but conflict-
ing evidence was presented tending to show that they were much larger
than necessary for this purpose. Their significance is enhanced by the
fact that tobacco in the hands of the farmer is perishable and must be
sold more or less immediately, whereas the Court found that these
stocks "assured [defendants'] independence of the market in any one
year." 21
Price Leadership: The pattern in pricing followed by the defendants
was as described in the following statement by the Court:
"The list prices charged and the discounts allowed by petitioners
have been practically identical since 1923 and absolutely identical
since 1928. Since the latter date, only seven changes have been
made by the three companies and those have been identical in
amount. The increases were first announced by Reynolds. Amer-
ican and Liggett thereupon increased their price lists in identical
amounts." 22
The defendants gave the usual explanation as to why they felt obliged
to meet the prices of their competitors. Three aspects of the evidence,
however, led the Supreme Court to characterize the pricing policies
of the defendants as follows:
"The following record of price changes is circumstantial evi-
dence of the existence of a conspiracy and of a power and intent to
exclude competition coming from cheaper grade cigarettes." 23
First, the defendants gave conflicting explanations as to why a
competitor's price had to be followed up (when one's costs did not re-
quire it) as well as down. The accumulation of explanations was as
summarized in the following statement by the Supreme Court:
"During the two years preceding June, 1931, the petitioners pro-
duced 90% of the total cigarette production in the United States.
20. Ibid.
21. Id. at 799.
22. Id. at 804.
23. Ibid.
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In that month tobacco farmers were receiving the lowest prices for
their crops since 1905. The costs to the petitioners for tobacco leaf,
therefore, were lower than usual during the past 25 years, and their
manufacturing costs had been declining. It was one of the worst
years of financial and economic depression in the country. On June
23, 1931, Reynolds, without previous notification or warning to the
trade or public, raised the list price of Camel cigarettes, constitut-
ing its leading cigarette brand, from S6.40 to 96.85 a thousand.
...No economic justification for the raise was demonstrated. The
president of Reynolds stated that it was 'to express our own courage
for the future and our own confidence in our industry.' The presi-
dent of American gave as his reason for the increase, 'the opportun-
ity of making some money.' . . .He further claimed that be-
cause Reynolds had raised its list price, Reynolds would therefore
have additional funds for advertising and American had raised its
price in order to have a similar amount for advertising. The of-
ficials of Liggett claimed that they thought the increase was a mis-
take as there did not seem to be any reason for making a price ad-
vance but they contended that unless they also raised their list
price for Chesterfields, the other companies would have greater re-
sources to spend in advertising and thus would put Chesterfield
cigarettes at a competitive disadvantage. This general price increase
soon resulted in higler retail prices and in a loss in volume of sales.
Yet in 1932, in the midst of the national depression with the sales of
the petitioners' cigarettes falling off greatly in number, the peti-
tioners still were making tremendous profits as a result of the price
increase. Their net profits in that year amounted to more than
S100,000,000. This was one of the biggest years in their history."
(Emphasis supplied) 2.
Second, there was strong circumstantial evidence of collusion be-
tween the defendants with reference to their price changes, quite apart
from the identity of their prices. For one thing, the changes were
almost simultaneous. As the Supreme Court discribed it:
". ..[]hen dealers received an announcement of the price in-
crease from one of the petitioners and attempted to purchase some
of the leading brands of cigarettes from the other petitioners at
their unchanged prices before announcement of a similar change,
the latter refused to fill such orders until their prices were also
raised, thus bringing about the same result as if the changes had
been precisely simultaneous." 25
There was also evidence that the A&P-utilized by all three petitioners
as a large-scale price cutter to force down retail prices, and compen-
sated therefor with favorable discounts and large cash advertising
24. Id. at 805.
25. Id. at 808.
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allowances-on at least one occasion received advance notice of man-
ufacturers' price changes.
26
Third, the price changes appeared to the Court to be without "eco-
nomic justification." The vulnerability of the 1931 increase has al-
ready been indicated. Speaking of the 1933 price cuts, the Court said:
[T]he petitioners, in January, 1933, cut the list price of their
three leading brands from $6.85 to $6. a thousand. In February,
they cut again to $5.50 a thousand. The evidence tends to show
that this cut was directed at the competition of the 10 cent cig-
arettes. . . .When thesaleof the 10 cent brands had dropped from
22.78% of the total cigarette sales in November, 1932, to 6.43%
in May, 1933, the petitioners, in January, 1934, raised the list
price of their leading brands from $5.50 back up to $6.10 a thou-
sand. During the period that the list price of $5.50 a thousand was
in effect, Camels and Lucky Strikes were being sold at a loss by
Reynolds and American. Liggett at the same time was forced to
curtail all of its normal business activities and cut its advertising to
the bone in order to sell at this price." -
Selective Selling: Each of the petitioners sold its products to jobbers
and selected dealers at list prices, less discounts. A great advantage
naturally accrued to any dealer buying at the discounted or whole-
sale price list.
The Tobacco case involved no criticism of selective selling as such.
The petitioners could hardly be expected to sell direct to all of the
million or more dealers who handle cigarettes at retail throughout the
country. In selecting jobbers they are presumably entitled to take
into account the number of jobbers already servicing the area, the
credit standing of the applicant, and his facilities for handling the
product. In admitting dealers to the direct list they are presumably
entitled to consider the volume of the dealer's business and the impact
of granting his application on the business of other local jobbers. The
government's case involved no attack on any of this.
The government's case was, however, predicated in part on alleged
abuses of the power involved in defendants' ability to grant or with-
hold the privilege of direct purchasing, with concomitant privileges
such as "free goods," "drop shipments," extra credit allowances and
advertising allowances. The court of appeals characterized defend-
ants' practices in this regard as illegal in themselves, quite apart from
any element of combination. The Supreme Court vigorously con-
demned these predatory practices.28
Cooperative Activities: The government's case was in no way pred-
26. See 147 F2d 93, 106 (6th Cir. 1944).
27. 328 U.S. 781, 806 (1946).
28. Id. at 808.
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icated on joint activities under NRA or in connection with meetings
held in the course of administration of AAA. These chapters in the
history of the industry did not figure in the case.
Other cooperative activities did. The district court admitted con-
siderable evidence concerning the Tobacco Merchants Association-
chiefly supported by the defendants, and engaged primarily in main-
taining a register of trademarks and copyrights, and in opposing un-
favorable state sales taxes. Most of the activity of the Association,
while apparently innocent, was considered relevant to show prior
association and opportunity. The government made a point of the
fact that the Association, while purporting to represent all tobacco
merchants, was in fact operated as the agency of the major manufac-
turers. The government also contended that a telegram jointly author-
ized by the defendants to a legislative agent stating that all three
would refuse to absorb a proposed sales tax amounted to a collusive
attempt at pricing-fixing.
There was also evidence concerning the Tobacco Association of the
United States. As the Court described it:
"The dates for opening the markets in the flue-cured belts are set
by the Tobacco Association of the United States of which buyers,
including petitioners, warehousemen and others connected with the
industry, but not including farmers, are members." -
This evidence was treated as relevant to show prior association and
opportunity, and as one more item in the accumulation of circum-
stances showing the dominant position in general enjoyed by the
defendants.
Local Tobacco Boards of Trade in the several market tow:ns figured
quite prominently in the case. Voting control in these Boards was
typically held by representatives of the defendants, and the record
showed that normally they would vote as a unit. These Boards set the
opening dates and closing dates for the local auction markets, and
promulgated rules governing the conduct of the auctions-including
the permissible speed of sale. The government contended that these
Boards constituted a part of the mechanism whereby the defendants
dominated the market, and that the rules and regulations promulga-
ted were contrived to facilitate the collusive fixing of leaf tobacco
prices, and the avoidance of competition for leaf among the defendants
themselves.
Speaking of the prior association of the defendants generally and
of its bearing on the case, the Court said:
"A friendly relationship within such a long established industry
is, in itself, not only natural but commendable and beneficial, as
29. Id. at 800.
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long as it does not breed illegal activities. Such a community of in-
terest in any industry, however, provides a natural foundation for
working policies and understandings favorable to the insiders and
unfavorable to outsiders. The verdicts indicate that practices of an
informal and flexible nature were adopted and that the results were
so uniformly beneficial to the petitioners in protecting their com-
mon interests as against those of competitors that, entirely from
circumstantial evidence, the jury found that a combination or con-
spiracy existed . ..with power and intent to exclude competitors
. . ." (Emphasis supplied) 10
D. "Monopoly" and "Conspiracy to Monopolize"
The certiorari in the Tobacco case was limited to the question-
"not . . . previously decided by this Court"-whether "actual ex-
clusion of competitors is necessary to the crime of monopolization
under § 2 of the Sherman Act." 11 The district court's instruction had
not called for proof of actual exclusion, the relevant portion being as
follows:
"Now, the term 'monopolize' . . . means the joint acquisition or
maintenance by the members of a conspiracy formed for that pur-
pose, of the power to control and dominate interstate trade and com-
merce in a commodity to such an extent that they are able, as a group,
to exclude actual or potential competitors from the field, accompanied
with the intention and purpose to exercise such power." (Emphasis
in original) 32
This instruction was approved, and the convictions for monopoli-
zation were affirmed. The opinion assumes that the facts called for
by the instruction, including the existence of the conspiracy to monop-
olize, were sufficiently established, the court of appeals having so held.
It also assumes "that an actual exclusion of competitors by the peti-
tioners was not claimed or established by the prosecution." 11 In the
course of the opinion the holding is restated even more strongly, as
follows:
"Neither proof of exertion of the power to exclude nor proof of ac-
tual exclusion of existing or potential competitors is essential to
sustain a charge of monopolization under the Sherman Act." 34
The rationale of this holding appears to be that the Act strikes at the
menace as well as at its fulfillment.35
30. Id. at 793.
31. Id. at 784.
32. Ibid.
33. Id. at 787.
34. Id. at 810.
35. Ibid.
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Intent to Monopolize: Both the district court's instruction and the
Supreme Court's opinion stress intent to exclude competitors (or to
fix prices) as an element of the offence. There was, however, little
occasion to define this intent in the Tobacco case, since the evidence so
clearly established the specific motive of the defendants to exclude man-
ufacturers of competing ten-cent brands, and to fix prices as well. In
other cases the precise requisites of the intent might or might not be
more sharply in issue.
Read as a whole, the Tobacco opinion suggests that a general, rather
than a specific intent will suffice. The following statements by Judge
Hand in the Alcoa case, quoted with approval by the Supreme Court,
are the most pointed:
"In order to fall within § 2, the monopolist must have both the
power to monopolize, and the intent to monopolize. To read the
passage as demanding any 'specific' intent, makes nonsense of it,
for no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing." 23
They were prefaced by quoting Judge Hand's discussion of the meaning
of the Act:
"Starting, however, with the authoritative premise that all con-
tracts fixing prices are unconditionally prohibited, the only pos-
sible difference between them and a monopoly is that while a mo-
nopoly necessarily involves an equal, or even greater, power to fix
prices, its mere existence might be thought not to constitute an ex-
ercise of that power. That distinction is nevertheless purely formal;
it would be valid only so long as the monopoly remained wholly in-
ert; it would disappear as soon as the monopoly began to operate;
for,when it did-that is, as soon as it began to sell at all-it must
sell at some price and the only price at which it could sell is a price
which it itself fixed. Thereafter the power and its exercise must
needs coalesce ...
"It does not follow because 'Alcoa' had such a monopoly, that
it 'monopolized' the ingot market: it may not have achieved mo-
nopoly; monopoly may have been thrust upon it. . . . [So far as
concerns the public interest, it can make no difference whether an
existing competition is put an end to, or whether prospective com-
petition is prevented. ...
" . . .[WiVe can think of no more effective exclusion than pro-
gressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened, and to face
every newcomer with new capacity already geared into a great or-
ganization, having the advantage of experience, trade connections
and the elite of personnel. Only in case we interpret 'exclusion' as
limited to manoeuvres not 7wnestly industrial, but actuated solely by a
desire to prevent competition, can, such a course, indefatigably pur-
36. Id. at 814.
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sued, be deemed not 'exclusionary.' So to limit it would in our judg-
ment emasculate the Act. . .... (Emphasis supplied) 17
Judge Hand was, of course, speaking with reference to Alcoa-a
single enterprise controlling approximately 90% of the virgin alu-
minum ingot market. But in the Tobacco opinion the Court found the
above statements "especially appropriate here." 3s It seems clear that,
given a conspiracy to monopolize, the aggregate power of the con-
spiring industry group will be viewed in much the same light as if it
were the power of a single and distinct enterprise, and this despite the
fact that the co-conspirators may seek to eliminate only certain forms
of competition among themselves, while continuing actively to compete
on other levels. In the Tobacco case, for example, it was never suggested
that the defendants did not compete in their advertising. Govern-
ment counsel conceded in summation to the jury that they did.
The net result of the foregoing discussion is that all transactions and
courses of dealing which involve any privity or reflect any community
of interest between two or more of the defendants-for it is from such
evidence that the government seeks to establish conspiracy-must be
evaluated not alone in terms of the actual purpose or motivation of the
parties at the time, but also in terms of the demonstrable economic
result. Evaluation by the court is made long after the fact, If that
evaluation indicates, as the Court put it in the Tobacco case, that
" . . .the results were .. .uniformly beneficial to the petitioners
in protecting their common interests as against those of competitors
S. . ," a conspiracy may be circumstantially inferred. The parties
will be held to have intended the natural and probable consequences
of their acts.
This brings us to the criteria to be applied. Broadly speaking, the
issue of conspiracy in each instance will turn on whether a transaction,
agreement, cooperative arrangement or common practice (pursued by
each with awareness that the others will probably do likewise) appears
to the Court to have had a substantial tendency to promote a mo-
nopolistic organization of the industry-or, failing that, to have been
done with a purpose to exclude actual or potential competitors.
Acts which may constitute circumstantial evidence of a common
purpose to monopolize may then be classified as follows: (a) Acts re-
garded as inherently tending toward monopoly, and so unconditionally
condemned. It is clear that agreements fixing prices fall into this cate-
gory.39 Other examples are discussed by Judge L. Hand in his Alcoa
opinion, including contracts dividing a territory among producers.4"
37. Id. at 813-4.
38. Ibid.
39. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
40. See 148 F.2d 416, 427-8 (2d Cir. 1945).
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The course of decision over recent years suggests that this category is
an expanding one. (b) Acts which, however laufi in themselves, can be
shown to have been done with a specific intent to exchde competitors to a
substantial extent. In discussing Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC,,"
which dealt with a combination of dressmakers who set up a boycott -
against retailers dealing in "pirated" designs, Judge Hand said:
"Although in many settings it may be proper to weigh the extent and
effect of restrictions in a contract against its industrial or commercial
advantages, this is never to be done when the contract is made with
intent to set up a monopoly." 42 (c) Other acts which, by eliminating
some competition between existing units in an industry, or invoking co-
operation between them, tend to preclude reasonably small cxisting or
potential competitors from competing effectively. This is the least clear
category. As Judge Hand has pointed out, "not all contracts which
in fact put an end to existing competition are unlawful." 43 Many of
the transactions and practices of which the government complained
in the Flat Glass case-plant acquisitions, cross-licenses, foreign li-
cense restrictions, use of a joint selling agency, and the like-con-
stitute evidence of conspiracy only if they can be brought within this
category.
The issue seems to turn on whether such transactions and practices
in the context of the particular industry appear to work substantially
against a "competitive" organization of the industry and in favor of a
monopoly. But these are relative terms, to be read in the light of cur-
rent interpretations of the policy of the Sherman Act.
Policy of the Sherman Act: In the Alcoa opinion Judge Hand de-
scribed the organization of industry sought to be fostered by the Act
as one of "small units which can effectively compete with each other."
As he put it:
"We have been speaking only of the economic reasons which
forbid monopoly; but, as we have already implied, there are
others, based upon the belief that great industrial consolidations
are inherently undesirable, regardless of their economic results.
...That Congress is still of the same mind appears in the Sur-
plus Property Act of 1944, . . . and the Small Business Mo-
bilization Act. . . .Not only does § 2(d) of the first declare it to be
one aim of that statute to 'preserve the competitive position of
small business concerns,' but § 18 is given over to directions de-
signed to 'preserve and strengthen' their position. . . .Through-
out the history of these statutes [the antitrust laws] it has been con-
stantly assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and
preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization
41. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
42. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 143 F2d 416, 423 (2d Cir. 1945).
43. Id. at 427.
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of industry in small units which can effectively compete with each
other." (Emphasis supplied) 44
And, amplifying the proposition that this state of things is desired
"for its own sake," and "in spite of possible cost," he said:
"In the debates in Congress Senator Sherman himself in the pas-
sage quoted in the margin showed that among the purposes of Con-
gress in 1890 was a desire to put an end to great aggregations of cap-
ital because of the helplessness of the individual before them." 41
The fact remains, however, that neither the Alcoa and Tobacco de-
cisions nor the Sherman Act itself furnish any quantitative measure of
ceiling size for production units in any other industry. Nor do they
tell us how effectively new units should be able to compete. Presum-
ably the units must be able to make and distribute a product of suf-
ficient quality and variety to meet contemporary requirements.
Beyond this, the criteria may be expected to vary from industry to
industry in terms of a great many factors such as: technological re-
quirements bearing on minimum effective size, capitalization, number
of plants, etc.; public interest in the development and maintenance of
strong domestic productive capacity and technological efficiency;
need for the product, and public interest in assured uninterrupted
production; conditions requisite to meeting foreign competition; public
interest in lowered costs; and unlawful practices in restraint of com-
petition by existing units in the past.
If the Sherman Act or decisions of the Court had established a quan-
titative measure of appropriate size for competing units in a given in-
dustry, it might be argued that such considerations of foreign and
domestic policy were irrelevant and outside the scope of an antitrust
case. National policy and "reasonableness" would, for better or worse,
be expressed in the Act and the decisions construing it. But such is
obviously not the case. Congress and the Court have expressed only
general qualitative considerations so far, leaving their application-
and the resolution of conflicts in what has been expressed-to judicial
process in the particular case.
In the Prayer for Relief in an equity case, the Antitrust Division
necessarily presents its conception of an organization of the given in-
dustry which would comport with the policy objectives of the Act.4"
If this conceptioiTappears valid, inferences of conspiracy are likely to
44. Id. at 428-9.
45. Id. at 428.
46. Cf. Levi, supra note 2, at 182-3: "But if the Sherman Act is to be made effective
in monopolization cases, something must be done about the relief secured from tile courts.
... There is no merit in the ceremony of finding a violation unless something like ad-
equate relief is to be granted .... It is silly to speak of atomization in the face of the
units that have been preserved, as for example in the Tobacco or in the Ainrican Can
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be drawn from transactions and practices which appear to have worked
against it, irrespective of the actual motivation of the parties at the
time. But if it can be shown that in terms of the foregoing criteria, the
government's proposed reorganization of the industry is absurd and
presently competing members of the industry are no larger or more
powerful than they need be, then the inferences of conspiracy fall.
E. Conclusions
The materiality of considerations of national policy in these cases
seems apparent from the nature of the issues posed in the govern-
ment's pattern of attack.
The current state and change in the technology of manufacture are
relevant to evaluate the scale of existing plants and capacity, the dis-
appearance of obsolete enterprises, the impracticability of small or
single-plant operation, the need for licensing and cross-licensing, and
to show the existence of competition between component parts of the
industry in improving methods of manufacture.
The economics of distribution in the industry are revelant to evalu-
ate the structure and practices adopted by the various companies, the
success or failure of particular distributors, the selection of factory
buyers, the geographical distribution of plants, the multiple operation
of plants under single management, pricing practices, and freight
absorption practices.
Price behavior comparisons with other industries are relevant to
evaluate unfavorable inferences drawn by the government, and to judge
whether price has been determined by economic conditions and com-
petitive factors rather than by a monopolistic power to fix prices or
through collusion.
The chief pre-trial question is as to the overall strategy of offense
and defense. Detailed preparation of witnesses, the integration of
cases. [An entirely different approach to the problem of relief is reflected in M1r. justice
Douglas' opinion in United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 196 (1944) :
'The pattern of past conduct is not easily forsaken. Where the proclivity for unlawful
conduct has been as manifest as here, the decree should operate as an effective deterrent
to a repetition of the unlavful conduct and yet not stand as a barrier to healthy growth
on a competitive basis.'] In this respect the courts have performed their function vith
a weariness suggesting that they believe it would be more appropriate for a commission
to do the job. [Cf. Mr. Justice Roberts in Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S.
1, 47 (1945).] There is merit in not having a commission charged with what wvould
look like the duty of supervising industry. Conceivably, however, a commission might be
charged with the duty of making recommendations to a court as to the appropriate form
of relief after violation has been found. The courts have not made use of the Federal
Trade Commission for this purpose and there probably is some merit in creating an office
separate from any agency having regulatory functions for this purpose. [Compare the
functions of the Surplus Property Board in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416, 446 (2d Cir. 1945).]"
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documents with testimony, and the integration of economic and tech-
nological expert testimony with other proof in the case, depend on the
strategy adopted. Two broad alternatives suggest themselves: (1) to
focus on an affirmative showing that as presently organized the in-
dustry is or is not monopolistic within the meaning of the Sherman Act
-the "effects" aspect of the case; or (2) to take a narrower focus on
"violation" as distinguished from appropriate "relief", which is likely
to result in a matching up of allegations in the Complaint with ad-
missions, denials and denials of knowledge in the Answer. For de-
fendants the latter approach presents certain disadvantages: (a)
Rarely will there be many specific transactions alleged in an Indict-
ment, Information or Complaint that are open to the defense that they
never occurred. (b) In almost all instances, the characterization of
the transactions embodied in the Complaint will be denied and dis-
puted'at all stages of the trial. (c) The overall conspiratorial character
of the transactions alleged is of course always denied and at issue. (d)
It is highly doubtful whether much probative force attaches to specific
testimony by witnesses who participated in the transactions to the
effect that they did not do so pursuant to the overall conspiracy alleged.
And (e) probably the most important contention as to these specific
transactions which the defense must be prepared to meet is that in the
aggregate they resulted in an industry situation in which new enter-
prises could not effectively compete. The government is not obliged to
prove that any or all of these transactions were done with any im-
proper intent or purpose (in the usual sense of specific criminal intent)
at the time. Of course the government could prevail by so proving.
But a conspiracy can equally well be established-and this is the more
common hazard in antitrust cases-by a showing that the net result of
past transactions is in fact a monopolistic one. The showing usually
consists in a cumulation of restrictive acts, transactions and circum-
stances. It is difficult to combat the cumulative effect successfully by
a line of defense which consists principally in seeking to justify par-
ticular acts and transactions. 47
A second issue in order of importance is whether the government
will succeed in proving a specific intent to monopolize, to restrain or to
drive out competitors, similar to that proved in the Hartford-Empire
case. 41 Success for the government on that score establishes a sub-
stantive violation, and some relief is indicated-the extent of relief
47. See, e.g., United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F.Supp. 753, 903-4 (D.N.J.
1949) per Forman, J.: "General Electric sought to separate the documents to which it
objected into isolated parts and apply the principles of evidence it advanced .... How-
ever, as the Court commented in United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, at page 544, . .,..
'[T]he character and effect of a conspiracy are not to be judged by dismembering it
and viewing its separate parts, but only by looking at it as a whole.'"
48. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
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depending upon the kind of showing the government may make in its
case as to effects. It is assumed, for purposes of this discussion, that
no transactions demonstrably illegal per se will be proved. If any de-
velop, they will fall into this general category.
Proof of specific intent in an antitrust suit cuts but one way-dis-
aster to the defendants. Since the alternative basis of monopolistic
effect is available to the government, however, proof of lack of intent
does not in itself insure success to defendants. Good or bad faith in
respect of particular transactions otherwise lawful is rarely the prin-
cipal issue, although there are usually instances of bad faith being
charged. Many cases do, however, raise questions as to the documented
specific purpose of particular transactions. To take an illustration
from the Hartford-Empire case: There were letters and memoranda
which spoke of acquiring patents for the purpose of eliminating a
competitor, for the purpose of monopolizing the art, and for the pur-
pose of suppressing troublesome competition. Any documentation of
this kind in reference to a transaction must be isolated for extremely
careful analysis and study of surrounding documents, circumstances,
personalities, etc.
A common variety of specific intent language is found in the letters
of sales managers to salesmen during periods of extreme depression
such as prevailed in the early 1930's where low-quality marginal pro-
duction created distress (in the sense of the Appalachian Coals case), 0
suggesting counter measures against destructive competition. Broadly
speaking, such expressions need to be evaluated in terms of the views
which were prevailing during the formulation and existence of NIRA
and the recognition at that time of the propriety of counter measures
of various kinds, coupled with the discontinuance of all this after the
change in the Government's policy in 1936 and 1937.
Another kind of specific intent which may be urged is a necessary
inference from restrictive clauses in agreements. Against these, one
broad line of defense, which used to be sanctioned by the courts but as
to which considerable doubt has been raised by recent decisions, was
that a restraint ancillary to otherwise lawful purposes was not antago-
nistic to the antitrust laws. In terms of proof, this means that the prin-
cipal purpose of the contract must be shown to be other than the re-
straint, and that the restraint must be shown to be reasonably ancil-
lary to the principal purpose of the contract. This will apply to all
manner of license agreements, sales agreements, purchase of property
agreements, and other instruments in which these ancillary restraints
may appear. It may be important in this connection to brief the law
as of the time when these restrictive covenants were entered into,
rather than as they exist today. It is also important, by way of dis-
49. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 283 U.S. 344 (1933).
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tinguishing the Associated Press case,50 to show that a defendant enter-
ing into such a restrictive covenant was not "dominant" at the time.
BURDEN OF PROOF AND STANDARDS FOR EVALUATING
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF CONSPIRACY
Two broad questions which have rarely been explicitly explored in
judicial opinions or legal literature specifically concerned with the
Sherman Act are: (1) What is the government's burden of proof in a
civil proceeding wherein relief of a relatively comprehensive and drastic
variety is sought? (2) Where an overall conspiracy through time is
sought to be demonstrated in either a criminal or a civil proceeding by
a manifold of acts and practices over a long period, what are the ap-
propriate standards for evaluating such circumstantial proof? The
questions are in a technical sense distinct; but since the violations al-
leged by the government as a basis for the decree sought are predicated
on an overall theory of continuing conspiracy between all of the de-
fendants, and since the government proposes to prove the conspiracy
circumstantially, the first question may, as we shall see, for practical
purposes be reduced to the second.5
A. The Government's Burden of Proof
Little if any affirmative indication that a "mere preponderance"
or "fair preponderance" of evidence should suffice to support findings
in favor of the government and substantial equitable relief can be found
in the opinions of the courts in Sherman Act proceedings. 2 Typically,
burden of proof is not mentioned in terms other than that a finding was
"established by the evidence," or that a violation was "proved". In
International Salt Co. v. United States, for example, a discussion of the
basis for equitable relief in the particular case is prefaced inerely by
these words: "When the purpose to restrain trade appears from a clear
violation of law .... ,3
This avoidance of a rigid formula is in accord with the general equity
50. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
51. See, for example, Judge Forman's discussion in United States v. General Electric
Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 903 (D.NJ. 1949), of the "broad discretion" and "great latitude"
permitted in the reception of evidence in antitrust conspiracy cases, citing both criminal
and civil proceedings.
52. But cf. United States v. General Electric Co., 82 F.Supp. 753, 904-5 (D.NJ.
1949) per Forman, J.: "Although the Government failed to support certain allegations of
the complaint, the preponderance of evidence produced in this case fully supports its
main contentions that General Electric conspired to, and did restrain trade and competi-
tion in and unlawfully monopolized the incandescent electric lamp industry in the United
States.
"All of the defendants moved at the end of the Government's case to dismiss the
action and renewed these motions at the end of the presentation of their defenses. In
view of the findings and conclusions hereinbefore discussed, the motions are denied."
53. 332 U.S. 392, 400 (1947).
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tradition of flexibility, and suggests that the strength of proof required
may well vary in terms of the seeming dictates of fairness in the par-
ticular case. Factors making for requirement of a burden of proof in
major antitrust proceedings higher than that customary in ordinary
private civil suits include the mixed character of the proceeding, the
elusive nature of so far-flung a conspiracy issue, the peculiar hazards
of error inherent in the necessity for its determination largely on the
basis of circumstantial evidence, and the severe character of the
equitable relief often sought by the government. The bearing of each
of these will be discussed in turn.
Mllixed Character of the Proceeding: It is often said that the Sherman
Act does not authorize mere punishment under the guise of equitable
relief. But it does differ in important aspects from an equity pro-
ceeding between private parties. As Justice Rutledge pointed out in
his partially dissenting opinion in Hartford-Empire Co. v. United
States:
"The so-called equitable character of the proceeding does not
nullify this inherent limitation upon appellate judicial action. Nor
does it justify an attitude which would circumscribe the suit or the
relief with the limitations courts of equity traditionally have put
around their action in private litigation. The anti-trust injunction
suit is in form 'a proceeding in equity'. In substance, it is a public
prosecution, with civilrather than criminal sanctions, for vindica-
tion of public right and for redress and prevention of public injury.
To regard the fashioning of appropriate relief in such a suit as iden-
tical with the same function in private litigation is to disregard at
once the former's statutory origin, its public character, and the pub-
lic interest it protects. The equitable garb of the proceeding there-
fore does not determine or conceal its true character. Nor does it
limit the required relief merely to what will prevent repetition of the
illegal conduct by which the combination has been formed, its prop-
erty acquired, and its dominating position secured." "
The relevance of such considerations, and of the actual severity of
a sanction or remedy irrespective of its technical classification as civil
or criminal, with particular reference to procedural and evidential re-
quirements of a fair trial, have been stressed by Morris R. Cohen. 55
Similar considerations have likewise led the courts to impose a higher
than ordinary burden of proof for a wide variety of issues in civil pro-
ceedings at law and in equity. These will be reviewed below.
Aspects of the Conspiracy Theory Which Require that it be Established
by Clear, Satisfactory and Convtincing Proof: The elusive quality of the
distinction between action in concert and similar practices independ-
ently pursued is familiar. In the former case we may have conspiracy;
54. 323 U.S. 386, 441-2 (1945).
55. Cohen, supra note 1.
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in the latter case presumably we have not, even though the result of the
action has been to restrain trade or promote monopoly-unless, of
course, each of the actors acted with knowledge that the others would so
act and was aware or should have been aware, at the time of acting, that the
result would be to restrain trade or promote monopoly. 11 In either way,
according to decisions to date, the government may establish a privity
as between the parties sufficient to warrant treating them collectively
as co-conspirators and, when they have sufficiently succeeded in what
they sought to do, as a monopoly.
Given an issue so defined, the distinction on which it turns involves
the imputation of subjective as well as objective attributes to such
acts of the defendants as the government may prove or upon which it
may rely. The subjective consists in the categories of knowledge and
purpose which are imputed to an acting defendant; and the objective
in the external effects in respect of restraint of trade or promotion of
monopoly which are imputed to his acts.
Elusive as the distinction may be, however, a firm insistence that
the minimum measure of privity between the defendants must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence is the sole protection of de-
fendants against a finding of guilt by unproved association. That such
a finding is no imaginary hazard is revealed by the view taken by some
commentators on the Supreme Court's opinion in the last American
Tobacco case. Consider, for example, Eugene V. Rostow's interpreta-
tion in his recent book, A National Policy for the Oil Industry:
"When three companies produce so large a percentage of market
supply, that fact alone is almost sufficient evidence that the statute
is violated. Ruthless and predatory behavior need not be shown.
The actual elimination of small competitors is unnecessary ...
Parallel action, price leadership, a reliance on advertising rather
than price competition as a means of inducing changes in each sel-
ler's share of the market, and above all, size-the market position
of a small number of large sellers or buyers-these are now key
points to be proved in a case of monopoly, or of combination in re-
straint of trade. From such evidence inferences of combination will
be drawn, if cautious pleaders rely on Section 1 as well as on Sec-
tion 2. But the content of an antitrust case has been enormously
limited and simplified, under Section 1 as well as Section 2. Pains-
taking search for scraps of evidence with a conspiratorial atmos-
phere are no longer necessary. There need be no parade of small
business men as witnesses, to testify that they have been driven
from the trade, and their lives ruined, by the ruthless squeeze of mon-
opolistic pressure. Under the Tobacco case, the economic fact of
monopoly is very close to being the legal proof of monopoly. The
decisive elements are the power to assert a degree of control over
56. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
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price and output in the market as a whole; and the power to deter
or discourage potential competition-even, as Judge Hand said,
by embracing 'each new opportunity as it opened,' and facing
'every newcomer with new capacity already geared into a great
organization, having the advantage of experience, trade connections
and the elite of personnel.'
" .. .Such powers inhere in the few large sellers who between
them produce the dominant fraction of supply. They are the in-
evitable economic consequences of size, within the structural frame-
work of a market which attaches particular strategic importance to
certain elements of control, and sets limits upon the extent to which
prices can safely be raised." 5
This statement seems to recognize that some element in addition to
size and power and similar conduct of business may be necessary to
transform the showing into a case sufficient to move a court to find
violation. That such recognition may be illusory, however, is suggested
by another statement by the same author elsewhere:
"But the precise issue decided by the Tobacco case was that a
small group of sellers dominant in a market could be treated col-
lectively as a monopoly, in Judge Hand's phrase; and both the To-
bacco and the Alumizum cases are totally at variance with the no-
tion of subjective intent which appears in Judge Hand's opinion
and in the Pullman case." 11
To be sure, there is no express warrant in the Sherman Act or any of
the decisions which interpret it for assuming, merely because several
companies in an industry may be of sufficient size and power collec-
tively to enjoy a monopoly if they act in concert, that in fact they can
or will act in concert; or for assuming that such an industry situation
came about through action in concert. These are still propositions
which must somehow be proved. Of significance are the observations
of Edward H. Levi in his article on The Antitrust Laws and MAlonopoly:
"The Supreme Court was careful to point out in the tobacco case
that it did not have before it the problem of the Alcoa case in that
a combination and conspiracy had been charged. But in its deter-
mination that no actual exclusion need be shown and its emphasis
on the power of the combination, the Tobacco case, like the Alcoa
case moves away from the abuse theory to the size or power theory.
The barrier placed against newcomers because of the advertising
expenditures of the defendants is specifically mentioned, not as an
abuse but as an illustration of the power of the combination. It is
57. RosTOw, A NATIONAL POLI Y FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY 136-7 (1948).
58. Rostow, The New Shcrnan Act: A Positive Instrument Of Progrcss, 14 U. or
Cm. L. REv. 567, 597 (1947).
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true, of course, that the jury found a combination and conspir-
acy."i 59
And again:
"It must be admitted further that the interpretations of the
Alcoa and Tobacco cases are problematical." 11
But what is this quality of concert (or privity) of action, without
which parallel lines of similar activity may be regarded as lawful in-
dependent courses of action but given which they are assimilated into
the conception of unlawful combination or conspiracy? The referents
of this key term obviously require clarification. Courts speak and
juries are instructed in terms of the subjective referents-"knowledge"
of the activities of other defendants, "purpose", and even "intent".
These, however, can only be imputed. The question is under what
conditions they will be. Courts also speak and juries are instructed in
terms of objective referents-"Monopolistic in tendency or effect,"
"restrictive of the trade of others," "calculated to deter others from
entering the field," etc. But these also can only be imputed; and, again,
the question is under what conditions they will be.
Determination of the conditions under which these various imputa-
tions will be made must depend on the values and viewpoint of those
who participate in the decision. Here we encounter the first major
source of uncertainty as to the issue of "action in concert." For while
those who must decide are charged with the interpretation and admin-
istration of a law in a manner consistent with its expressed objectives,
it is only one in the total context of laws affecting the conduct of in-
dustry. The national interests on which it is focussed are only a few
in the totality of our national interests. Inevitably, there is a certain
confusion and lack of integration of objectives. In the economic field,
indeed, the government often appears to speak with many voices. As
a former First Assistant and Chief of the Consent Decree Section of the
Antitrust Division has expressed it:
"The existence of a strong anti-monopoly tradition and of great
economic concentration represents a confusion in the anti-mon-
opoly tradition itself. We are not sure whether we are against mon-
opoly or the abuses of monopoly. We do not know whether we want
regulated competition or regulated monopoly. We do not know
whether we are opposed to size or merely to unreasonably high
prices. The confusion is deep and is a part of the tradition." 11
This current confusion, unavoidable though it may be, creates a real
hazard that a defendant's conduct and position in an industry may be
59. Levi, supra note 2, at 178.
60. Id. at 181.
61. Id. at 153.
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judged in terms of values which are not only unfair to him but unrep-
resentative of national policy in a more comprehensive sense.
If the ranked order and total pattern of the values to be served were
less confused, the conditions under which subjective guilt and ob-
jective social harm would be imputed on the basis of observable be-
havior and material conditions could be more intelligibly formulated.
Workable standards for judgment and guides to compliance could re-
duce both unevenness of administration and the probability of policy
error. As matters now stand, however, sheer uncertainty as to the
meaning and policy of the law in its application to a concrete industry
situation would seem to entitle a defendant to more protection than
would be afforded by the lowest civil burden of proof.
Given issues of considerably less difficulty, particularly in a pro-
ceeding of an equitable nature, it has often been customary to impose
a higher burden of proof than that otherwise prevailing in civil actions.
As Wigmore puts it: "[A] stricter standard, in some such phrase as
'clear and convincing proof,' is commonly applied to measure the nec-
essary persuasion" to prove such issues as fraud, undue influence, an
oral contract as a basis for specific performance, and prior anticipa-
tory use of an invention. 2
Severe Czaracter of the Sanctions Sought to be Ivokcd: Relative
severity of the sanction or remedy which may be imposed has often
been considered a sufficient reason to require a higher degree of prob-
ability in proof than would otherwise be required in a civil action.
Were this not the case, the procedural guarantees with respect to
burden of proof intended for persons accused of "crime" could often be
circumvented in substance by resort to "civil" proceedings affording
equally if not more severe remedies.
It was once thought both in England and the United States, indeed,
that wherever facts constituting crime were alleged in any type of
civil action, whether as part of the cause of action or as matter in de-
fense, such allegations should be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 3
This was put on various grounds: (1) that a person against whom crime
was thus proved in a civil action could be prosecuted therefor at one
stage of common law without further formal accusation or indictment;
(2) that this higher burden of proof was necessary to overcome the
62. 9 WIGMoRPE Evm-icE 329-34 (3d ed. 1940). See also Speas v. Merchants' Ban!:
and Trust Co. of Winston-Salem, 18 N.C. 524, 523, 125 S.E. 393, 401 (1924) (indicating
that proof of issues of the sort listed above must be "clear, strong and convining");
Frenzer v. Frenzer, 2 F2d 218 (8th Cir. 1924), cert. denicd, 269 U.S. 574 (1924) ("Clear,
satisfactory, and convincing evidence is indispensable to sustain an oral agreement of a
deceased person to convey, charge, or change his title or interest in real estate") ; Holt v.
Brown & Co., 63 Iowa 319, 325 (1884) (discussing the "clear and convincing pr-,of" rule
prevailing in equity) ; and cases collected in 32 C.J.S., Ezidence § 1023.
63. See 9 1VIG.oMR, EvnDENcE §§2497-S; Groom, Proof of Crine in a Cfzil Procecd-
ing, 13 AtrNN. L. REv. 556 (1929).
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presumption of innocence; and (3) that the injury to reputation in-
volved in proof of crime even in a civil action made the higher burden
of proof proper. This position has now been generally abandoned,
though there is still some tendency to require a burden of proof higher
than a "mere preponderance" in such cases even though the action is
merely one for damages.
4
A recent and clear-cut example of adjustment of the burden of proof
to the actual severity of the sanction or remedy invoked, irrespective
of the technically "civil" character of the proceeding, is afforded by
Knauer v. United States, a proceeding to cancel a certificate of natural-
ization obtained by fraudulent oath and statements of allegiance. The
Court prescribed "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence which
does not "leave the issue in doubt" as the appropriate burden of proof,
on the ground that "denaturalization, like deportation may result in
the loss 'of all that makes life worth living.' " 11 To be sure, no anti-
trust Prayer for Relief has as yet requested that offending management
officials be denaturalized and deported. Prayers do, however, ask for
dissolution, divestiture and divorcement; and these are severe sanc-
tions-affecting the careers and fortunes of management individuals as
well as of the corporate organizations. Certainly they involve prospec-
tively operating decrees of perpetual exclusion and permanent pro-
scription from opportunity, factors which have been considered sig-
nificant reasons for the highest procedural safeguards in other con-
texts.6
B. Standards for Evaluating Circumstantial Evidence of Conspiracy
Apart from the overall burden of proof in a case, many courts have
attempted to define generally the minimum strength of persuasion
which circumstatinal evidence must possess to support a verdict or
finding in an ordinary civil proceeding. Presumably these latter stand-
ards rise with the overall burden of proof, particularly where a case is
based primarily on circumstantial evidence.
Reasonable Certainty Rule: One common formulation in the federal
courts as to the requisite strength of persuasion of circumstantial
evidence in civil cases generally is that it must establish the truth of
64. See Note, 124 A.L.R. 1378 (1940). Cases cited in this collection for the position
that a mere preponderance of evidence will suffice to establish allegations of crime in a
civil action are almost exclusively actions at lav rather than in equity or of an otherwise
special character.
65. 328 U.S. 654, 659 (1946).
66. Cf. the Supreme Court's reaction to a "legislative decree of perpetual exclusion"
and "permanent proscription from any opportunity" to engage in a chosen vocation in
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), wherein a provision in an appropriation
bill that no part thereof or of any future appropriations should be used to pay salaries to
certain named federal employees was held so penal in character as to be void as a bill of
attainder.
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the fact or theory advanced "with reasonable certainty." 17 In such
cases it is also said that the party need not present evidence to dispel
all contradictory inferences. Failure so to do would of course affect
the weight of the evidence if not its bare sufficiency; and in any event,
on all of the circumstances adduced, it would be necessary that the in-
ference contended for appear more probable than any alternative ex-
planation which might be suggested.
Reasonable Certainty and Ex-clusion of Other Explanations: Another
line of cases, however, requires not only that the circumstances point
to the existence of the fact to be established with reasonable certainty,
but that they also be inconsistent with "any other rational theory" or
"fairly and reasonably exclude any other explanation of the facts." C3
C. Conclusims
In reviewing findings of fact and decree provisions in civil proceed-
ings brought by the government for enforcement of the Sherman Act,
courts have conspicuously avoided rigid formulae such as "preponder-
ance of the evidence" or "proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Reasons
for this are readily apparent. The proceedings are of a mixed character,
being equitable in form but authorized and designed solely to undo the
consequences and prevent the recurrence of violations of a criminal
statute. The factual situations for inquiry range from readily ascer-
tainable single concrete transactions to complex industrial relation-
ships of an allegedly conspiratorial character which can at best be only
circumstantially inferred. The array of remedies available in such pro-
ceedings is equally diversified, ranging from relatively mild and non-
punitive injunctions against future repetition of particular unlawful
practices to highly depriving decrees of dissolution, divestiture and
divorcement. Then, too, there are no juries requiring guidance as to
the burden of proof.
Pretty clearly, the "mere preponderance" rule applied in ordinary
private civil actions at law involving neither the infliction of relatively
severe legal sanctions nor the determination of inherently difficult and
elusive issues of fact, would be inappropriate in proceedings for the
enforcement of the Sherman Act. In other types of civil actions in-
volving unusually delicate issues of fact, the award of relatively drastic
equitable relief, or the infliction of other types of legal sanctions which
67. E.g., Adair v. Reorganization Inv. Co., 125 F.2d 901, 905 (3th Cir. 1942) ; Cudahy
Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 116 F2d 367, 371 (Sth Cir. 1940).
68. Rider v. Griffith, 154 F2d 193, 197 (Ct. Cus. & Pat. App. 1946); Mutual Life
Insurance Co. of New York v. Zimmerman, 75 F.2d 75S, 762 (5th Cir. 1935) ; and United
States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123, 127 (E.D.Pa.1943), aff'd, 330 U.S. E06 (1947),
reh'g denied, 331 U.S. 865 (1947), wherein the government argued that the practices of
the defendants up to the time of suit were "such that only an organization with complete
monopolization of the market which it serves could follow them."
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though technically classified as civil are recognized as extremely de-
priving, a higher burden of proof is generally required. Presumably,
in Sherman Act proceedings, this higher burden of proof must be con-
ceived as flexible, rising in proportion with the hazard of mistake im-
plicit in the nature of a given issue and with the drastic nature of the
sanctions invoked by the government.
The higher overall burden of proof applicable here would, by analogy
to other civil proceedings most comparable in kind, probably have been
characterized as "clear, satisfactory and convincing proof" or in words
of similar effect, had the courts had occasion to articulate more pre-
cisely the standard actually applied.
Since the "action in concert" pursuant to a common plan on which
the government predicates its case must be proved by circumstantial
evidence of repeated acts or continuing practices through time, certain
recognized standards for the evaluation of circumstantial evidence in
relation to such a probandum (i.e., the subjective conspiratorial pur-
pose and pattern imputed to the defendants in the government's Com-
plaint) are applicable. These are: (a) all of the facts established-the
data adduced, after it has been checked for value judgments, accuracy,
etc.-must be consistent with the government's hypothesis of conspir-
acy as defined; (b) all other reasonable hypotheses or explanations
which are also consistent with the facts established must be eliminated
by satisfactory proof; and (c) the hypothesis must in addition be tested
for its truth through time (i.e., its validity as a basis for prediction).
This latter corresponds to the experimental stage in a scientific inquiry.
To state the foregoing criteria is to suggest that the government's
hypothesis of conspiracy, given the nature of the available data and
the familiar problems of inquiry into things social, is not susceptible
of proof on any level of probability high enough to be deemed con-
clusive for purposes of social science and technology. Verification
through experiment is out of the question; and there are too many un-
controllable variables. But it is understood, for these reasons, that in-
quiry and determination in the judicial process must usually rest on
lower degrees of probability than could be accepted in the sciences.
The question is: How much lower?
In speaking generally of circumstantial proof in ordinary civil cases,
the federal courts have more often than not said that the circumstances
as a whole must point to the existence of the fact to be established
"with reasonable certainty"; and, what is perhaps more important,
they have recognized that such evidence must in some satisfactory
degree meet more than one of the three generally accepted tests for
circumstantial (or empiricaI-inductive) proof outlined above. Consider-
ing that in the light of the ordinary canons of reasoning an hypothesis
might quite conceivably survive the first two types of test and yet, on
subjection to the third, prove altogether false as of any given point in
1048 [Vol. 58: 1019
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time, this degree of caution in drawing inferences from a mass of circum-
stantial evidence even in the ordinary civil action is hardly surprising.
A fortiori, considering the elusive and factually complex character of
an antitrust conspiracy issue, the gravity of the legal sanctions in-
voked, and the large public interest in correct determination of ques-
tions which so directly involve the whole balance of the national econ-
omy, special caution would appear in order in a case of this kind.
But if this higher degree of caution in drawing inferences is to mean
more than a verbal gesture ("violation being clearly proved," "the
findings being amply supported by the evidence," etc.), it must be
translated into criteria of less subjective and ambiguous reference. The
following suggest themselves as workable yardsticks.
One measureable dimension of the government's proof will be its
success or failure to meet with some plausibility all three of the general
requirements for circumstantial proof of an hypothesis as outlined
above. The first-which consists in showing consistency of the facts
adduced with the government's theory of conspiracy-is the easiest.
The second-which consists in showing inconsistency of the facts ad-
duced with all other possible theories or explanations-is more dif-
ficult. The third-which consists in showing that all of the conse-
quences and behavior on defendants' part which might reasonably
have been predicted or anticipated, assuming the existence of con-
spiratorial purpose at a given time, did in fact occur-is of course the
most difficult. But, passing the question of the minimum degree of
persuasion which may be deemed significant as to any one of these
three aspects of the proof, the government's case may be rated in terms
of its serious engagement on all three, only two, or only one of these
fronts.
Another measurable dimension of the government's proof will con-
sist in the frequency of recurrence of acts relied upon as a series to show
a continuity and consistency of purpose. The validity one may assign
to inference of this order is of course dependent on a previous decision
as to the minimum rate of frequency which may be deemed significant.
A third measurable dimension of the government's proof is suggested
by the circumstance that it consists in a manifold of events. Ideally,
demonstration of the conspiracy hypothesis in any one of the three ways
outlined above would have to account for all of the known facts. An
initial question with respect to any inference which may be advanced,
therefore, is whether it rests on the whole manifold or only a part, and
in the latter event on what part. This degree of inclusiveness of the
base is another way of rating the plausibility of proof in support of
an inference.
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